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NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
a discretion guided by certain criteria such as: (1) bad faith on the
part of the member in violation of the rules; (2) disruptive friction
which may be aroused within the organization by judicial interference;
(3) the presence or absence of any interest of substance; (4) public
interests and interests of third persons; (5) seriousness of the breach ;28
(6) probable effect of resort to the internal remedies of the association
if such remedies might accomplish the desired result; (7) adequacy of
other judicial remedies.
Whether or not the court will grant injunctive relief in the final
analysis should depend on the particular circumstances of each case.
The eventual answer must be one based upon practical considerations, a
balance of the seriousness of violation and the need for relief against
the disadvantages of intervening in the affairs of the particular associa-
tion involved. W. BRAXTON SCHELL.
Constitutional Law-Due Process-Admissibility of
Confessions and Police Abuses
The Supreme Court of the United States, in an effort to protect the
individual against certain police practices, is imposing on the state courts
a new test for the admissibility of confessions. The test might be called
the "pressure-abuses" test. It is prescribed for the states under the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and is designed to
displace the old "testimonial trustworthiness" test. The latest applica-
tion of the new test came in three cases decided last summer, Watts v.
Indiana," Turiwr v. Pennsylvania,2 and Harris v. South Carolina.3
The old test, generally accepted over the country, was simply this:
If a confession were the result of such pressure that there would be a
fair chance that the accused would tell a lie, the confession was ex-
cluded. The courts talked of "voluntary" and "involuntary" confes-
sions, of promises, threats, and physical abuses, but the underlying idea
of nearly all the cases was that a confession would be excluded if it were
given under such pressure that it would be untrustworthy.4 The extent
of police abuses-illegal detention, delay in arraignment, failure to ex-
" Dean Pound suggests that the chancellor might well ask these questions: Is
the injury serious enough to warrant the extraordinary interposition of equity?
Is it serious enough to warrant the expense and consumption of public time in-
volved in a judicial proceeding? In cases involving fraternal orders, churches or
secret societies, is it serious enough to balance the practical difficulty involved in the
court's endeavor to learn, interpret and apply the laws and customs of the organi-
zation? Pound, Equitable Relief Against Defamation and Injuries to Personality,
29 HARv. L. REv. 640, 680 (1916).
1338 U. S. 49 (1949). '338 U. S. 62 (1949). '338 U. S. 68 (1949).
3 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§822, 824 (3d ed. 1940). But Dean McCormick dis-
agrees that the sole underlying basis for the confession rule is desire to protect
against untrustworthiness. McCormick, The Scope of Privilege in the Law of
Evidence, 16 TEXAs L. REv. 447, 451-457 (1938).
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plain rights, etc.-was not considered, except in so far as those abuses
might tend to make the confession untrustworthy from the evidence
standpoint. North Carolina, too, followed the "testimonial trustworthi-
ness" test.5
The test which the United States Supreme Court has now prescribed
for the states is a stricter one. It says that not only will a confession
be excluded which is testimonially untrustworthy, but also a confession
will be excluded which, even though trustworthy, is obtained by some
degree of pressure coupled with substantial police abuses.
In federal courts if a confession is obtained after the proper time for
arraignment has passed, it is inadmissible regardless of its trustworthi-
ness and regardless of the decorum of the police. 6 This federal court
rule is based on the idea that there is little chance for police abuse if
arraignment is early. The rule is one of evidence, not an expression of
a constitutional right. The new state court test is much more nebulous.
It demands a weighing of pressures and abuses, and it is made no easier
to grasp and apply by the fact that the Supreme Court continues to talk
of "voluntary" and "involuntary," language traditionally associated with
the old test. Indeed it is only by examining the fact situations in par-
ticular cases and by reading some of the dissents that we can be sure
a new test has been laid down.
Perhaps the first indication that the Supreme Court was going to
demand more of state courts than testimonial trustworthiness came in
Ward v. Te.ras,7 decided in 1942, but it was not until the famous case
of Ashcraft v. Tennessee8 that the new test became clearly discernible.
Ashcraft, a white man of good reputation and standing in the commu-
nity, was arrested on a Saturday evening and questioned continuously
until early Monday morning, when he confessed. There was no war-
rant for his arrest, and he was not arraigned until after his confession
'"The test accordingly laid down in the more recent decisions is whether the
confession 'was made under circumstances that would reasonably lead the person
charged to believe that it would be better to confess himself guilty of a crime he
had not committed."' STANSBURY, NORTH CAROLINA EVIDENCE §183 (1936).
'Upshaw v. United States, 335 U. S. 410 (1948) ; McNabb v. United States,
318 U. S. 332 (1942).
7316 U. S. 547 (1942). The Court cited the following cases, but it is to be
noted that none of them clearly adopts the new test: Wan v. United States, 266
U. S. 1 (1924) (arose in federal court); Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U. S. 278
(1936) (state court did not contend confessions anything but coerced) ; Chambers
v. Florida, 309 U. S. 227 (1940) (case might be considered first to apply new test,
but not clear that old test of testimonial trustworthiness not applied); Canty v.
Alabama, 309 U. S. 629 (1940) (per curiam) ; White v. Texas, 310 U. S. 530
(1940) (brief opinion; not clear new test applied) ; Vernon v. Alabama, 313 U. S.
547 (1941) (per curiam) ; Lomax v. Texas, 313 U. S. 544 (1941) (per curiam,
but facts given in state court opinions suggest that this decision looks toward new
and stricter rule; police abuses seem less extreme than in some earlier cases;
Lomax v. State, 136 Tex. Cr. R. 108, 124 S. W. 2d 126 (1939), second appeal, 142
Tex. Cr. R. 231, 144 S. W. 2d 555 (1940), revfd again per curiant, 313 U. S. 544
(1941), third appeal, 146 Tex. Cr. R. 531, 176 S. W. Zd 752 (1943)).
0322 U. S. 143 (1944).
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on Monday. He was kept incommunicado and deprived of sleep. Even
so there was evidence that his confession was not the result of intimida-
tion by the police. Mr. Justice Black for the majority talked of the
"inherently coercive" 9 situation and stressed the abuses of power by the
police. He was not very greatly concerned with the testimonial relia-
bility of the confession. Mr. Justice Jackson, writing a three-judge
dissent, called attention to the fact that a new test was being imposed on
the state courts.' 0
The Ashcraft doctrine was reaffirmed in Malinski v. New York."
Malinski was arrested before eight o'clock one morning and confessed
late that afternoon. In the meantime he was held without warrant in
a Brooklyn hotel room and made to strip. He may have feared a "shal-
lacking," but he was not questioned continuously. Mr. Justice Douglas,
for the Court, talked the old language of fear and coercion, but it seems
clear that a much stricter test than that of testimonial trustworthiness
was applied; the Court seems to have had one eye on police abuses. Mr.
Justice Frankfurter, concurring, said that the whole proceedings "offend
those canons of decency and fairness which express the notions of jus-
tice of English-speaking peoples even toward those charged with the
most heinous crimes.' 2
Again in Haley v. Ohio's a majority of the Court applied the new
test. There a fifteen-year-old Negro boy was arrested about midnight
and questioned for five hours or so until he confessed. The four dis-
senting justices seemed to think that something nearer the old test of
testimonial trustworthiness should have been applied, for Mr. Justice
Burton said, "The question in this case is the simple one-was the
confession in fact voluntary?"'14 But the majority held that, in view of
the boy's age and race and in view of the intensity of the questioning
and of the fact that he was without counsel, there was a "disregard of
the standards of decency." As in the Ashcraft case, the opinion empha-
sized the "inherently coercive" situation and refused to accept the jury's
verdict that this particular defendant was not in fact coerced to the
point of untrustworthiness.
The three cases decided last summer all involved Negroes arrested
without warrants' 5 and held for five or six days of more or less inten-
sive questioning before confessions were obtained. No counsel or rela-
tives were permitted to see the persons accused, and no preliminary
examinations were held until after the confessions were obtained. In
Id. at 154. 20 Id. at 156.
11324 U. S. 401 (1945). 22 Id. at 417.
"332 U. S. 596 (1948). 21 Id. at 615.
"In Harris v. South Carolina, 338 U. S. 68 (1949), a warrant had been issued
charging the accused with stealing a pistol, but the warrant was not read to him,
and he was not informed of the charge against him. In actuality he was wanted as
a suspected murderer.
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one of the cases the accused was kept for two days in a place called
"the hole,"' 16 where he had to sleep on the floor. In another the accused
was an illiterate, 17 and in all of the cases there were other aggravating
circumstances. It seems from the facts given in the state and federal
reports that the evidence of actual coercion in these three cases was
greater than in the Ashcraft case and perhaps greater than in the Ward,
Malinski, and Haley cases. And, although it is difficult to evaluate the
various police abuses, they would seem to have been as flagrant in these
three cases as in any of the four earlier cases.' 8 Indeed the decision in
the three latest cases, in view of Ward, Ashcraft, Malinski, and Haley,
seems to have been a logical necessity. The fact that the state courts
in the three cases did not use the new test may indicate either' an un-
awareness that the old test has been changed or a dislike of the new
one.19
The new test rests on a handful of opinions and a few per curiam
decisions. In all of the cases with full opinions, the Ward case alone
excepted, there were strong dissents. The Ashcraft and Watts cases
were six-three decisions. The Malinski, Haley, Turner, and Harris
cases were five-four decisions. The permanence of the new test seems,
therefore, uncertain, especially in view of the fact that two of the jus-
tices who have consistently been with the majority, Justices Murphy and
Rutledge, have died since the last cases were decided.
PRESSURE-ABUsES TEST AND THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE
It has long been established that the Due Process Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment does not fasten on the states eighteenth or nineteenth
century common law modes of trial and procedure. Rather the Clause
guarantees "immunities . . . implicit in the concepts of ordered lib-
erty, ' '20 "standards of fundamental fairness," 2' principles of justice so
rooted in the traditions and consciences of our people as to be ranked
1" Watts v. Indiana, 338 U. S. 49 (1949).
"Harris v. South Carolina, 338 U. S. 68 (1949).
"s Under any system of weighing police abuses, clearly one important element
would be length of time that a suspect is unlawfully detained before the confession
is made. In the Ward case the time was perhaps 40 hours; in Ashcraft, 36 hours;
in Malinski, 10 hours; in Haley, 5 hours; while in the three latest cases the time
was five to six days. In the Ashcraft and Haley cases it might even be argued
that there was no unlawful detention since the periods of detention were presumably
at times magistrates were not available. Of course such other elements of police
abuse as over-lengthy periods of questioning, failure to explain constitutional rights,
and deprivation of sleep and food must be considered in connection with the length
of detention and with the nature of the person accused.
10 State v. Harris, 212 S. C. 124, 46 S. E. 2d 682 (1948) (court mentioned
federal decisions but stated, without explaining, that they did not apply) ; Watts
v. State, 82 N. E. 2d 846 (Ind. 1948) (no mention of United States Supreme Court
decisions on admissibility); Commonwealth v. Turner, 358 Pa. 350, 58 A. 2d 61(1948) (express statement that old rule on admissibility was proper one).20 Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U. S. 319, 324 (1937).
21Fay v. New York, 332 U. S. 261, 294 (1947).
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as fundamental. 2 2  Indeed the Clause as construed seems nearly as
large as fairness and justice themselves. It is clear that any conviction
based on a confession that is not trustworthy would be a deprivation
of life and liberty without fairness and would therefore violate the
Clause.2 3 But the new test says that an element which is to be con-
sidered along with pressure on the accused is police abuse. Does such
a test represent a radical departure in interpretation of due process?
It should be noted first that the Clause has not been limited to a
requirement that the proper result be reached in the particular trial;
the Court has gone further and demanded that that result be reached
with some dignity. Thus a reversal may sometimes be had even though
the defendant is clearly guilty as charged.2 4
But has the Clause as traditionally interpreted extended to pre-trial
events? Some of the language in cases, other than those which enun-
ciate the new test, indicates that the Clause does extend beyond the trial
and protect against substantial pre-trial irregularities.2 5 Logic seems to
demand this result; if at the trial itself we are concerned, not solely
with getting a fair conviction, but also that that conviction be obtained
with some dignity of method, why should that same dignity of method
not be required of pre-trial events? An abuse before the trial is no less
a violation of "civilized standards,"2 6 no less a denial of "fundamental
principles of liberty."27 The pre-trial irregularity, however, is different
in one important respect: a new trial cannot correct it; to hold it fatal
would be to turn the criminal lose. The Supreme Court's solution is to
consider the pre-trial irregularity but to insist that it contribute in some
way to the result of the trial. A new trial which disregards the fruits
of the irregularity is held to cure the defect. In Lisenba v. California-"8
there were police abuses which the Court condemned, but the abuses had
not led to the challenged confession. The Court refused to reverse for
the abuses alone since they had not "fatally infected the trial."2 9
" Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U. S. 97, 105 (1934).2
*E.g., Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U. S. 278 (1936).2
"E.g., Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U. S. 510, 535 (1927). General statements of scope
of Due Process Clause support this view. E.g., Carter v. Illinois, 329 U. S. 173,
175 (1946) ("ultimate dignities of man") and Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U. S.
319, 324 (1937) ("ordered liberty").
2' Chambers v. Florida, 309 U. S. 227, 236 (1940) (Fourteenth Amendment
protects people "charged with or suspected of crime"). But in other cases there
is language which sounds as if the Due Process Clause, except for its effect in
restraining substantive laws of states, is limited to the trial itself. E.g., Frank v.
Mangum, 327 U. S. 309, 340 (1915) ; Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U. S. 78, 110
(1908) ("Due process requires that the court ... shall have jurisdiction . . . and
that there shall be notice and opportunity for hearing."). But such restrictive lan-
guage has been used in cases involving only the trial itself; pre-trial irregularities
were not under consideration.
" Cf. Malinski v. New York, 324 U. S. 401, 414 (1945) (Mr. Justice Frank-
furter concurring).
"7Cf. Hebert v. Louisiana, 272 U. S. 312, 316 (1926).
28314 U. S. 219 (1941) ; accord, Lyons v. Oklahoma, 322 U. S. 596 (1944).
-'314 U. S. 219, 236 (1941).
[Vol. 28
NOTES AND COMMENTS
It thus appears that the pressure-abuses test is not a radical depar-
ture in the theory of due process. But in practice the test obviously
carries the Clause into new areas, and the question which immediately
arises is: How far will this extension of application go? If the Court
now frankly sets about to reform the manners of state police officials,
will there be any stopping place short of complete standardization of
police and court procedure throughout the country?
One answer to this widespread fear is that the Court has a long
tradition of self-restraint on due process questions. The cases are full
of statements that the states are free to choose their own methods for
dealing with crime so long as "fundamental rights of the prisoner shall
not be taken from him arbitrarily."30 "We adhere to this policy of self-
restraint and will not use this great centralizing Amendment to stand-
ardize administration of justice and stagnate local variations in prac-
tice." 3 '
Certainly it is to be hoped that the Court will continue to recognize
the value of local responsibility and initiative in the administration of
justice. If the Court sits over the nation exercising its conscience on
every detail of police procedure, state courts and legislatures will tend
to abdicate their duties. State citizens will learn to feel that the solu-
tion to every police abuse comes, not from local and state initiative, but
from the remote and standardizing opinions of the Court in Washington.
Local experimentation will die along with local consciences. But if the
police abuses are as gross as were those in the cases last summer, per-
haps occasional interference from the Supreme Court will prove to be
just the spur needed by state citizens and courts.
PRESSURE-ABUSES TEST AND LAw ENFORCEMENT
It remains to be considered whether the new test on admissibility is
desirable from the standpoint of its effect on law enforcement.
Miss Irene Savidge and Sir Leo Money were sitting on a bench in
Hyde Park in 1928 when they were arrested by two policemen on a
charge of behaving "in a manner reasonably likely to offend against
public decency." They were taken before a magistrate, who dismissed
the charge, but later the Director of Public Prosecutions asked that a
statement be obtained from Miss Savidge. She was visited at her place
of employment and voluntarily agreed to attend an inquiry at Scotland
Yard. The inquiry lasted about four hours. Tea was served at four
o'clock, and Miss Savidge and the two officers enjoyed a cigarette
apiece. About six-thirty Miss Savidge was driven home by the chief
inspector. 32
" Frank v. Mangum, 327 U. S. 309, 334 (1915) ; Avery v. Alabama, 308 U. S.
444, 446 (1940) (Fourteenth Amendment "not intended to bring to the test of a
decision of this Court every ruling made in the course of a state trial").
" Fay v. New York, 332 U. S. 261, 295 (1947).
"
2 Reported in National Commission on Law Observance and Enforcement,
Report No. 11, Lawlessness in Law Enforcement, 259-261 (1931).
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This interrogation of Miss Savidge precipitated a -debate on the
floor of Commons, a commission of three to investigate the case, and a
Royal Commission of eight to investigate the entire field of police powers
and procedure-so sensitive are the English to police abuses!
The English police are told that after they have made an arrest they
must forego any questioning at all until the prisoner is in the police
station.3 3 Then the charge is explained to the prisoner, and he is told
that he is not obliged to talk but may do so if he wishes and that any-
thing said may be used in evidence. Even if the prisoner then chooses
to make a statement, no questions may be asked him except to clear up
ambiguities. If the police have made no arrest but are merely seeking
a statement from a prospective witness, it is suggested that they preface
their remarks as follows: "I am a police officer. I am making inquiries
into (so-and-so), and I want to know anything you can tell me about
it. It is a serious matter, and I must warn you to be careful what you
say."34
The new pressure-abuses test is a development in the direction of
Efigland, but the Supreme Court in this test is far indeed from prescrib-
ing English rules for our police.35 The Court is not attempting to
outlaw all arrests on suspicion nor all questioning before arraignment.
In the Watts case the Court said that the evil aimed at was "protracted,
systematic and uncontrolled subjection of an accused to interrogation."' 0
It may be that the Court would even sanction an inquisitorial system
modeled on that of the Continent provided the state adopting it also
adopted that system's safeguards.37 The attempt is to attain, whatever
the system, the "rudimentary requirements of a civilized order."3 8
In 1931 the Wickersham Commission reported that the extortion of
confessions by the police by mental or physical pressure was widespread
in this country.39 Although it mdy be hoped that such abuses are less
" Royal Commission on Police Powers and Procedure, CmD. No. 3297 at 114.
Quoted 3 WIGIORE, EVIDENCE §847.
34 Ibid.
" It is true, of course, that the problem of law enforcement in England is dif-
ferent from that in this country. England's well-selected and well-trained police
operate in a small country and deal with a society which has a low crime rate and
a strong tradition of respect for the police and of co-operation with them. Bdt
England and America are alike in sharing the accusatorial, as opposed to the
inquisitorial system; in both countries formal presentment and the privilege against
self-incrimination are basic assumptions in the administration of justice. Hence
we may expect to learn something from England's experience in the hope of
moving toward the "order, dignity, urbanity, and dispatch" which seem to charac-
terize her criminal law. See HOWARD, CRIMINAL JusTcE Im ENGLAND (1931).
O338 U. S. 49 (1949).
" Ibid. The Court pointed out that under the accusatorial system the accused
is "protected by the disinterestedness of the judge in the presence of counsel. See
Keedy, The Preliminary Investigation of Crime it; France, 88 U. OF PA. L. REV.,
692, 708-712 (1940)."
8 Ibid.
"' National Commission on Law Observance and Enforcement, oP. cit. supra
note 32, at 153.
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frequent now, the. three cases of last summer indicate that long deten-
tions and protracted examinations are not yet unknown. It has often
been argued that such practices are necessary to law enforcement. 40
But England and those American cities which are almost completely
free of the third degree provide a powerful counterargument. 41 What
the third degree gains in the immediate case it seems to lose in the long
run. When illegal procedures are adopted to achieve a worthy end,
not only are the liberties of the individual infringed, but the police sac-
rifice some of the public's respect and willingness to co-operate. Secret
detention naturally tempts to a distortion in Court of the facts of the
detention. The end result is that the police are demoralized, and the
public, suspecting abuse, fails to hold the police in the high esteem which
proper enforcement of the law demands.42  It seems logical to assume,
moreover, that the possibilty of illegal detention and questioning dis-
courages scientific investigation and leads to reliance on "unimaginative
crude force."'43
It is not within the scope of this note to say what the precise limi-
tations on pre-arraignment police practices should be. But surely de-
tention on mere suspicion of from five to seven days, deprivation of
counsel and friends, and intensive questioning through the detention are
an unjustifiable invasion of the liberty of one who is presumed to be
innocent. Furthermore such practices, it is believed, are harmful in the
long run to the police departments and to the cause of efficient law en-
forcement. Civil suits and criminal prosecutions against the officers
have proved ineffective. 44 The exclusion of confessions obtained by
such extreme abuses seems a salutary development in criminal law.
JOHN P. KENNEDY, JR.
Domestic Relations-Child's Interest in the Parental Relation-
Suit by Infant for Enticement of Mother
One of the ideas most often asserted and most generally accepted
in the field of jurisprudence in recent years is that law should be squared
with the knowledge -developed by the social sciences.1 This does not
" For an excellent recent statement of this argument see Inbau, The Confession
Dilemma in the United States Supreme Court, 43 ILL. L. REv. 442 (1948).
" See survey of third degree practices in fifteen representative cities, National
Commission on Law Observance and Enforcement, op. cit. supra note 32, at 83-
152, 188-189.
"See Chambers v. Florida, 309 U. S. 227, 240 n. 15 (1940).
" Haley v. Ohio, 332 U. S. 596, 606 (1948) (Mr. Justice Frankfurter concur-
ring). See National Commission on Law Observance and Enforcement, op. cit.
supra note 32, at 187-189; 8 WIGMORE, EvImzNcE §2251.
For a delightful discussion of the whole problem of police abuse see Warner,
How Can the Third Degree Be Eliminated?, 1 BILL OF RIGHTS REv. 24 (1940).
Also McCormick, Admissibility of Confessions, 24 TEXAS L. Rv. 239 (1946).
"ORFIELD, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE FROM ARREST TO APPEAL 28-31, 66 (1947).
'POUND, INTRODUcTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 98 (1922) ; CARDOzo, THE
NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 75 (1921).
